Research

My work focuses mainly on the nature of spatial and geometric representations in human and non-human animals. Studying these representations can help us make headway on important philosophical issues, such as the following: the cognitive foundations of formal geometry, the nativism/empiricism debate, the structure of the mind, the nature and origin of spatial concepts, the sources of cognitive flexibility, differences between human and non-human animal cognition, the role of language in human cognition, the relevance of evolutionary considerations in psychological theorizing, and the relationship between psychological and neuroscientific theorizing.

PUBLICATIONS:

A. Duval & C. Klein (2026). "Pain asymbolia is probably still pain", 93(1), 221-229, Philosophy of Science. PDF

Trevor Griffith and Adrian Kind argue that we should reject a standard interpretation of pain asymbolia, according to which asymbolics experience pain even though their pain lacks the affective-motivational element that typical pains possess. We make the case that Griffith and Kind’s reasons for rejecting the standard interpretation are relatively weak. We end by arguing that debates between the standard interpretation and alternative interpretations cannot be resolved without addressing the issue of how we should taxonomize pain asymbolia as a neurological condition.

A. Duval (2025). "In defense of language-independent flexibility, or: What rodents and humans can do without language", 40(1), 93-119, Mind & Language. PDF

There are two main approaches within classical cognitive science to explaining how humans can entertain mental states that integrate contents across domains. The language-based framework states that this ability arises from higher cognitive domain-specific systems that combine their outputs through the language faculty, whereas the language-independent framework holds that it comes from non-language-involving connections between such systems. This article turns on its head the most influential empirical argument for the language-based framework, an argument that originates from research on spatial reorientation. I make the case that neuroscientific findings about spatial reorientation in rodents and humans bolster the language-independent framework instead.

A. Duval (2024). "Is there only one innate modular system for spatial navigation?", Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 47, e125. Commentary on “Précis of What Babies Know” by Elizabeth Spelke. Final draft

Spelke convincingly argues that we should posit six innate modular systems beyond the periphery (i.e., beyond low-level perception and motor control). I focus on the case of spatial navigation (Chapter 3) to claim that there remain powerful considerations in favor of positing additional innate, non-peripheral modules. This opens the door to stronger forms of nativism and non-peripheral modularism than Spelke’s.

A. Duval. & C. Côté-Bouchard (2023). "The motivation problem of epistemic expressivists", Ergo, 10(26). PDF

Many philosophers have adopted epistemic expressivism in recent years. The core commitment of epistemic expressivism is that epistemic claims express conative states. This paper assesses the plausibility of this commitment. First, we raise a new type of problem for epistemic expressivism, the epistemic motivation problem. The problem arises because epistemic expressivists must provide an account of the motivational force of epistemic judgment (the mental state expressed by an epistemic claim), yet various features of our mental economy seem to show that they can’t do so. Second, we develop what we take to be the most promising response to that problem for expressivists. We end by noting that this response faces an important challenge pertaining to the psychology of epistemic criticism and praise.

C. Klein & A. Duval (2023). "Is pain asymbolia a deficit or a syndrome? Historical reflections on an ongoing debate", Belgrade Philosophical Annual, 36(2), 41–57. PDF

Nikola Grahek’s influential book Feeling Pain and Being in Pain introduced philosophers to the strange phenomenon of pain asymbolia. Subsequent philosophical debate around asymbolia has been partly taxonomic: the deep question is whether it is best understood as a specific neurological deficit or part of a broader syndrome. This paper looks to the history of asymbolia, positioning the origin of the term within broader historical trends. It shows that strange phenomena about pain and motivation have always presented interpretive challenges, and suggests that the current debate mirrors a historical split between German and French traditions. This does not resolve the debate, but does help place it within broader scientific and philosophical contexts.

A. Duval (2019). "The representation selection problem: Why we should favor the geometric-module framework of spatial reorientation over the view-matching framework", Cognition, 192, 103985. Final draft

Many species rely on the three-dimensional surface layout of an environment to find a desired goal following disorientation. They generally do so to the exclusion of other important spatial cues. Two influential frameworks for explaining that phenomenon are provided by geometric-module theories and view-matching theories of reorientation respectively. The former posit a module that operates only on representations of the global geometry of three-dimensional surfaces to guide behavior. The latter place snapshots, stored representations of the subject’s two-dimensional retinal stimulation at specific locations, at the heart of their accounts. In this paper, I take a fresh look at the debate between them. I begin by making a case that the empirical evidence we currently have does not clearly favor one framework over the other, and that the debate has reached something of an impasse. Then, I present a new explanatory problem--the representation selection problem—that offers the prospect of breaking the impasse by introducing a new type of explanatory consideration that both frameworks must address. The representation selection problem requires explaining how subjects can reliably select the relevant representation with which they initiate the reorientation process. I argue that the view-matching framework does not have the resources to address this problem, while a certain type of theory within the geometric-module framework can provide a natural response to it. In showing this, I develop a new geometric-module theory.